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The phenomenon of altruism extends from the biological realm to the human sociocultural
realm. This paper sketches a coherent outline of multiple types of altruism of progressively
increasing scope that span these two realms and are grounded in an ever-expanding sense of
“self.” Discussion of this framework notes difficulties associated with altruisms at different
levels. It links scientific ideas about the evolution of cooperation and about hierarchical order to
perennial philosophical and religious concerns. It offers a conceptual background for inquiry into
societal challenges that call for altruistic behavior, especially the challenge of environmental and
social sustainability.
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Introduction
This paper takes a broad view of altruism, from its simplest occurrence to its highest
manifestation. “Altruism” here means action that benefits others at relative cost to oneself. This
definition is especially applicable to the most elementary manifestations of this phenomenon;
higher manifestations might simply be called ethical behavior or – focusing on the internal roots
of such behavior – “empathy” (Rifkin 2010).
What is proposed here is a hierarchy of types of altruism that involve a progressively expanding
sense of “self.” The hierarchy extends from the biological realm to the human sociocultural
realm, a transition both continuous and discontinuous. The biological realm extends into the
cultural realm, but the latter conditions its influences and introduces new factors that can
increase the scope of empathy. In the lower realm, altruism is analyzed by evolutionary theory,
where alternative ideas such as kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and multilevel selection give
different perspectives on what causes the association (in technical terminology, the
“assortment”) of helpers (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009; Fletcher & Zwick, 2006; Queller, 1985). In
this paper we define levels based on the identity of the recipient of altruistic behavior, e.g., kin,
interaction partners, group members, but boundaries are not sharp, since kin may interact
reciprocally or be members of the same group. In the upper realm, altruism is among the subjects
taken up by religion, philosophy, and the social sciences. This essay draws on these sources, but
stays within a naturalistic worldview. Its purpose is to enrich philosophical discussion with
ideas from biology and systems theory.
The scheme of levels of altruism is based on general ideas about hierarchical order that have
been usefully applied to other topics (Zwick 1978, 2009). Here they yield the hierarchy of
Figure 1. This scheme organizes diverse knowledge in a “crude look at a whole” (Gell-Mann
1994). A coherent image of the range of possible altruism types, and the difficulties associated
with them, may stimulate thought about societal challenges that call for altruistic behavior,
especially the challenge of environmental and social sustainability.
8. BEING ALTRUISM
7. Life altruism
6. Sentience altruism
5. Species altruism
4. GROUP ALTRUISM
3. INTERACTION-BASED ALTRUISM
2. KIN ALTRUISM
1. SELF-INTEREST

(Predominantly)
cultural realm
(top-down)

(Predominantly)
biological realm
(bottom-up)

Figure 1. Levels of Altruism
Level 1 is not actually an instance of altruism, but is the foundation for all the higher levels. An all-caps case is
used for the predominantly biological realm (levels 1-4); an italics font is used for the sociocultural realm (levels 47). Level 4 is all-caps and in italics to indicate that it partakes in both realms. Level 8 is all-caps to mark
completion of the hierarchy and, simultaneously, the manifestation of a qualitatively different phenomenon.
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1. SELF-INTEREST
The foundation of action for others is action for oneself, the possibility of which first emerges in
the evolution of life. A living system is one that can “act on its own behalf” (Kauffman 2000);
this demarcates the biological from the merely physical. Understanding living systems requires
the fundamental categories not only of matter, energy, and information, but also of “utility,” a
fourth category introduced into science by game and decision theory (von Neumann &
Morgenstern 1944). Utility – and its elementary manifestation in “fitness” – allow the
phenomenon of “interests” to be treated with generality and precision.
To speak of an individual “acting on its own behalf” is not necessarily to assert intention,
cognition, rationality, or consciousness or to invoke a final cause explanation of behavior. A
bacterium acts on its own behalf when the external presence of food molecules leads to the
synthesis inside the cell of proteins that import and digest this food, and enable the bacterium to
maintain its internal order and reproduce. This is a final cause explanation only in its invocation
of an optimality principle, namely fitness-based selection.
Fitness has four features that invite further comment: First, it is a property not of an individual
but of the individual-environment interaction. Second, biological agency is “rational” in being
governed by utility, but for simple organisms that lack cognitive subsystems, rationality is
vicariously achieved for the individual by natural selection. Only in complex organisms, e.g.,
those with nervous systems, is utility – and rationality – partially internalized. Third, the
individual-environment interaction is open-ended in time. To use Derrida’s notion of
“différance” (1982), except for extinction, “final” evaluations of fitness are indefinitely deferred.
Fourth, the interaction involves at least two levels: organism and population. The population
evolves by changes in composition, but from another perspective, selection acts on
thermodynamically self-maintaining units. A biological individual acts on its own behalf via
self-construction and self-maintenance, i.e., “autopoiesis” (Maturana & Varela 1980).
Successful action of this sort is a precondition for reproductive fitness, so what is fundamental to
“having interests” is the metabolic maintenance of order. This is echoed by the top level of
Figure 1, which refers to altruism towards “being” in its most general sense, which implies an
order that has at least minimal persistence.

2. KIN ALTRUISM
The earliest appearance of “having interests” leads immediately to its extension, to individuals
acting also on the basis of the interests of others. This is possible because the other is not wholly
other, but similar in some degree to self, especially when the other is related to self in origin.
Once action governed by self-interest is promoted by evolutionary selection, its extension to kin
is inevitable, and this extension is often regarded as the principal manifestation of altruism
(Foster, Wenseleers, & Ratnieks, 2006; Lehmann & Keller, 2006; West, Griffin, & Gardner,
2007).
Level 2 thus marks the first appearance of altruism proper, but the transition from self-interest to
kin altruism is not a sharp break. The other is an extension of self. This is captured in the idea
of "inclusive fitness," (Hamilton, 1964), reductionistically and anthropomorphically spoken of in
terms of "selfish genes" (Dawkins 1976). Extension is both in time and in space: in time it
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encompasses progeny; in space it encompasses relatives. Progeny and relatives, being
genetically similar, are not wholly other. As with self-interest, kin altruism does not require
conscious action or recognition.
The biological realm actually extends all the way up the hierarchy, and for human beings, the
sociocultural realm extends all the way down (the two domains shown in Figure 1 only mark the
ranges where biology and culture predominate.) One cannot overestimate the human significance
of altruism towards kin. The parent-child bond manifests this phenomenon in its strongest form,
although game theorists have shown that this bond is not free of conflict of interest (Trivers,
1974). Early forms of human social organization – hunting and gathering and also agricultural
societies – were based on kinship. Later forms of social organization on larger scales build on
the family unit, and rarely completely transcend kinship. A stumbling block to the stability of
large scale human organizations has always been “patrimonialism” (Fukuyama 2011), i.e.,
corruption motivated by the desire to pass wealth and power to progeny and relatives. Religious
and philosophical moral teachings give family relations great emphasis, as illustrated by the
Commandment to honor one’s father and mother, or in more extreme forms such as ancestor
worship. Confucius and Socrates both asserted the priority of filial obligations over obligations
to unrelated persons, explicitly rejecting a universalism that asserts an absolute parity in our
moral obligations to other persons.

3. INTERACTION-BASED ALTRUISM
From altruism towards kin, nature ratchets up to altruism towards agents in direct interaction
with the individual, i.e., to reciprocal altruism. An individual often does not know which other
individuals are genetically related, so a proxy for genetic relatedness is needed. Propinquity is
one possible proxy, since those close by are often kin. An alternative proxy is altruistic behavior
by the other agent. Actually it doesn’t matter whether or not the other agent acting altruistically
is kin or not as long as the helping genotypes of interest are associated (“assorted”) with the
giving behavior of others—even if a different species (Fletcher & Zwick 2006). Kinship is the
simplest way to get altruism established, not its essence.
The human significance of reciprocal altruism is as salient as kin altruism. The principle of
reciprocity is implicit in the Golden Rule, and in the biblical injunction to love your neighbor,
although the latter might be viewed as an injunction calling for group altruism. Reciprocity is
the key to harmonious relations in all small groups, even of kin. We, and presumably other
social animals, are biologically primed to track the actions of others and note failures of
reciprocity (Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010).
In Axelrod’s (1984) reciprocal altruism simulations, tit-for-tat (TfT) was the most successful of
the strategies submitted. Tit-for-tat is “nice,” i.e., cooperating first and in response to
cooperation by the other, “provokable,” i.e., responding to defection with defection, “forgiving,”
i.e., responding to the resumption of cooperation with cooperation, and “transparent,” i.e., acting
in a way readily grasped by others. In the analysis of reciprocal altruism, it is not genotypic
similarity that is critical to altruism, but assorted phenotypic behavior (Fletcher & Zwick, 2006;
Queller, 1985).
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4. GROUP ALTRUISM
Genetic relatedness and the informational capacities needed for reciprocal altruism (to remember
other agents and their past actions) may both be absent. Generalized reciprocity (actions based
on past experiences in general) and indirect reciprocity (actions based on reputation of others)
are not based on personal acquaintance and approach altruism based on group membership.
Although there is controversy about the relative strength of group selection (Leigh, 2010;
Williams, 1966), even those dismissive of its significance (Lehmann & Keller, 2006; West et al.,
2007) acknowledge mechanisms of help that are keyed to the display of identifying tags, know in
the evolutionary biology literature as “green beard” effects (Dawkins, 1976; Queller, 2011).
Group altruism – more generally, group solidarity – is very important in human society, and
occurs at multiple levels, ranging from small groups, organizations, communities, ethnic groups,
nations, followers of the same religion, etc. Solidarity with other members of one’s community
or ethnic group is a ubiquitous and important social phenomenon. Nationalism is a potent
historical force, as is class solidarity. It has been argued (Wilson 2002) that the evolutionary
“function” of religion is precisely to promote group cohesion. It is plain that the rational actor
view of human nature in economic theory is only partially correct; in addition to “self-assertion,”
individuals also show a tendency to “integration” into larger groups (Koestler 1978).
Human nature has been endowed by evolution with a predisposition towards cooperation, given
the right circumstances, with those with whom we identify. We also live in a context of culture,
which provides motivations for altruistic action. So human group altruism is supported from
both “below” (nature) and “above” (culture). Direct biological support is strong only up to the
scale of small groups, but it still provides a basis for further increasing the scope of altruism at
higher levels.
This basis is constituted by proximal supports for altruism that become salient, manipulable, and
detached from their original ultimate (evolutionary) causes. These proximal supports include
hormonal factors, mirror neurons that model the other as self, and parts of the brain that are
dedicated to detecting defection. Layered on top of genetically-based evolutionary factors are
nervous system-based societal and cultural factors. Game-theoretically, behavior is no longer
simply dictated by one’s own “base-level” utility, but on higher level utilities (“social motives”)
that depend also on the base-level utilities of others (Messick & McClintock 1968). The key to
altruism in human groups is thus the extension of self, via proximal mechanisms, to encompass
others. In Confucian moral philosophy, this extension was conceptualized in the notion of tui
(Nivison 1996).
Group altruism, however, is not a simple good. It generally requires between-group competition.
Group solidarity often promotes aggression towards outsiders. “The egoism of the group feeds
on the altruism of its members” (Koestler 1967). The evils of human history may be due more to
the tendency towards integration than towards self-assertion.

5. Species altruism
Universal ethics calls for species altruism: the human other is to be regarded as the same as self.
This is the largest meaning of “neighbor” in the biblical “You shall love your neighbor as
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yourself” or of “other” in the Golden Rule. It is implied in the Talmudic saying that he who
saves a life saves a complete world and in Kant’s categorical imperative of acting in such a way
that one’s action is a rule for humanity. But the endorsement of the sacredness of every human
being by all the major religions has not eliminated from these teachings doctrines and practices
that deny such universality. In practice as opposed to theory, humanity’s religions have attained
mostly to group altruism, directed only towards members of the same faith.
From the perspective of game theory, species altruism faces a fundamental difficulty. Species
altruism requires the extension of altruism to the human species as a single group, but game
theory seems to predict that, without competing groups, defection in this one group would go
unchecked. However, culture and societal influences, not adequately encompassed by this
theory, can promote cooperation even in a single group.
Altruism towards conspecifics is still not the highest level of altruism. The attainment of species
altruism might end poverty and war, but would not solve the problems that arise from
humanity’s interaction with nature. Exploitation of other species isn’t precluded by a
universalization of empathy towards the entire human species, but since the exploitation of
nature is also the means by which some humans exploit others, species altruism will only be
achievable when the exploitation of nature is significantly mitigated.

6. Sentience altruism
Of the myriad forms of life, it is sentient beings who are most easily felt to be similar to self.
The Buddha said that life is suffering, and the most concentrated kind of suffering is pain.
Empathy and compassion are naturally directed towards other sentient beings who can
experience pain. Pain is, however, the bottom of the scale of similarity; intelligence, emotion,
and play are at the top of the scale, hence our ready empathy for other primates and dolphins.
Sentience altruism is supported by commonality of genotypes; for example, we share 98% of our
genotype with apes. It is also enabled by the phenomenon of mirror neurons and by our “theory
of mind” about other sentient beings. Indeed, it may be easier to extend compassion to animals
than to extend it to other human beings, because the competition we also feel towards other
persons is absent. The Confucian sage Mencius, trying to influence King Xuan to behave more
humanely to his subjects, noted that the king felt empathy for an ox being led to sacrifice, and
urged the extension (tui) of this empathy to his human subjects, telling the king, “Your
compassion is sufficient to reach animals, yet you do nothing for your people” (Nivison 1996).
But logically, altruism towards conspecifics should be stronger, since other humans are more
like us than other creatures.

7. Life altruism
The extension of empathy towards sentient beings still allows destructive behavior towards
nature. It leaves out, as an object of empathy, the plant kingdom, as well as animal species
judged to be non- or insufficiently sentient, and thus cannot protect the biospheric web on which
all life depends. It fails to generate a “yes” answer to the question, “Should trees [and by
implication all living beings] have standing?” (Stone 1972). Altruism limited to sentient beings
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does not, for example, preclude cutting down rain forests, which are critical for controlling
greenhouse gasses.
Altruism manifests its largest scope in reverence for life, for the thin biospheric film of the earth
that we and all sentient life are part of. Life is a result of the interaction of the macrocosm of
cosmic energies and the microcosm of inert matter. It mediates this interaction, and has the
potential to play a central role in the universe. Human beings, more specifically, have the
responsibility (Jonas 1984) to preserve and enhance the life that flourishes on this planet. We
cannot discharge this cosmic responsibility if empathy rises only to the level of species altruism.
Biospheric sustainability requires biocentric, not anthropocentric or even sentient-centric, values.

8. BEING ALTRUISM
Life altruism is the limit of the phenomenon of organisms “having interests.” But by virtue of
both biology and culture, a further extension into a qualitatively different order is possible. For
the Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming, “…instead of ‘no self’ [the focus of Buddhist
thought] the ideal moral attitude is ‘pan-self’ … this is expressed in the idea that for the perfect
moral person ‘all things are one body’.” In Wang’s more excited moments, ‘all things’ include
even the inanimate and nonliving. “One who is truly good winces even when seeing a tile
broken.” (Nivison 1996). Similarly, for Augustine, being itself was inherently good, and evil
was privation, non-being. The possibility of an “I-Thou” relationship (Buber 1937) extends
beyond life. It may be that species, sentience, and life altruisms must be rooted above in this
transcendent realm.

The hierarchical model
The above discussion was guided by a general hierarchical model described previously (Zwick
1978, 2009). In accord with that model, the hierarchy of Figure 1 consists of a small number of
levels that divide into two domains: biological and sociocultural. There is a spontaneous
ascending biological tendency that instantiates the lowest levels without difficulty, from selfinterest to kin altruism to interaction-altruism, but ascent falters after entering the upper domain
at group altruism. At that point, continued ascent requires the assistance of a top-down –
sociocultural – influence. Mechanisms of the lower domain continue in the upper domain but
are transformed by its radically different character, ultimate genetic factors being largely
superseded by proximal psychological factors. When the limits of the upper domain are reached,
further ascent might yet achieve a qualitatively different manifestation. Altruism thus has what
Chinese philosophy called “two roots” (Nivison 1996): one below in biology, and one above in
culture, or, in a Platonic perspective, in transcendental values that we accept. Chinese
philosophy – Mencius, specifically – also had an alternative “one root” view, which held that
altruism has a unitary basis in our innate moral heart-mind. Probably Mencius would say that
our biological disposition towards altruism and its transcendental value are in fact one and the
same, the gift and the imperative of Heaven.
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